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With the support from the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA),  this  paper  presents  the  findings  from  a  two-month 
comparison  study  between  the  underground  economy  in  China 
and the West. Significant differences were found which are due to 
traditional  boundaries  of  crime,  such  as  cultural  and  language 
barriers. Lastly, Social Network Analysis (SNA) is proposed and 
discussed as a tool for future cybercrime research. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The last decade has seen fascinating transformation in the nature 
of  cybercrime,  from  solely  destructive  to  omnivorously  profit 
seeking. With this transformation was the change in the ways in 
which  cybercrimes  are  committed  as  cybercriminals  become 
increasingly  collaborative  and  organized.  Individuals  with 
different  skill-sets  join  in  ephemeral  relationships  to  commit  a 
common act  and to reproduce their skills and knowledge  [11]. 
This trend is relatively well researched in the West but very little 
is known about the Far East and especially China. 
As China’s internet presence continues to grow rapidly, the state 
of cybercrime in China can no longer be ignored. Therefore, a 
two month qualitative study on Chinese cybercrime was carried 
out  with  the  support  from  U.K.’s  Serious  Organised  Crime 
Agency  (SOCA).  The  findings  from  this  study  were  then 
compared  with  the  workings  of  the  Western  underground 
economy. The results of this comparison study are presented in 
this paper and the application of Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
is proposed and discussed as a potential tool to study cybercrime 
in future research. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows: section 2 presents some 
related work. Section 3 presents the characteristics of the current 
Western  online  black  markets.  Section  4  presents  the 
characteristics  of  the  Chinese  underground  economy  and 
compared with that of the West. Section 5 presents a discussion of 
the results and Social Network Analysis (SNA) as a tool to study 
cybercrime in future research.  
2.  RELATED WORK 
Related work falls into two categories: underground economy on 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and Chinese cybercrime. 
Two previous studies have focused on the underground economy 
on  the  IRC  channels.  In  their  work,  Thomas  and  Martin  [9] 
present a concise introduction to the workings of the underground 
economy and the actors involved. The work of Franklin et al. [3] 
also focused on IRC channels but their work involved keeping 
track of the advertisements by capturing IRC logs over a 7 month 
period. Their analysis was focused on examining characteristics 
such  as  sensitive  data  types,  credit  card  types  and  country  of 
issuing banks.  
With  regards  to  Chinese  cybercrime,  the  most  closely  related 
study is the work by Zhuge et al. [14] in which they examine the 
Chinese underground economy with a focus on virtual assets such 
as  QQ  accounts  and  equipments  in  online  games.  Their  work 
involved  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  posts  made  on  the  largest 
bulletin  board  in  China,  post.baidu.com  (now  known  as 
tieba.baidu.com or Baidu Tieba).  
The study presented in this paper is unique from the above in that 
the focus is on the carding activities that occurs on the World 
Wide Web rather than IRC and that the underground economy in 
China and the West are treated as separate subjects of study.     
3.  WESTERN ONLINE BLACK MARKETS 
While this study does not intend to eliminate the possibility of 
Chinese carders collaborating with Western carders, it was found 
that a substantial portion of Chinese carders operate differently 
from their Western counterparts.  
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, due to the workings of the 
internet  and  the  need  to  preserve  anonymity,  it  is  hard  for  a 
criminal  to  place  trust  on  another  online  identity.  This  is 
problematic for those seeking to trade and profit from carding. As 
documented by von Lampe and Johansen, in the criminal world, 
one of the ways to reduce risk in the absence of trust is to test 
merchandises  before  a  transaction  is  made.  This  increases  the 
need for negotiation and the author believes this is where some of 
the Chinese carders hit the language barrier. Secondly, there is a 
cultural  difference  in  the  tools  they  use,  such  as  payment  and 
communication applications. This will be discussed in section 4. 
Thus, the focus of this study is on understanding how the Chinese 
carders  operate  by  drawing  on  SOCA’s  information  on  the 
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 Western carders. This section presents infrastructure of the online 
carding markets in the West. 
3.1  Online carding forums 
Aside from the well researched IRC channels, it is observed by 
Peretti  [5]  and  agreed  by  SOCA  that  most  Western  carding 
activities  occur  in  closed  membership  forums.  Members  are 
usually “vouched” in through previous transactions with existing 
members or the quality of the “goods” they offer are tested. 
 
Figure 1: Shadowcrew, one of many carding forums shut 
down by the FBI and SOCA 
Figure 1 is a screenshot of a carding forum called Shadowcrew 
which began operation in 2002. It provided an exchange platform 
for  carders  and  hackers  to  trade  goods  and  services  with  free 
membership.  The  contents  were  available  in  both  English  and 
Russian  in  order  to  increase  geographical  dispersion  of  its 
members so that the availability of cash-out and drop
1 locations 
would increase. Shadowcrew was shut down by the U.S. and 
international law enforcement agencies in Operation Firewall in 
2004 [1,2].  
Shadowcrew, like many other  online carding forums, contained 
sub-forums to serve different purposes  such as trading, how-to 
tutorials, disputes and rippers report. Members could also contact 
each other privately using the private messaging service. 
3.2  General management hierarchy 
Due  to  the  ways  online  forums  are  structured,  most  Western 
carding  markets  have  an  inherently  hierarchical  management 
structure, as described in the Operation Firewall indictment [1]. 
Such a management hierarchy is shown in figure 2. The role of 
each actor is summarised below. 
Administrators: they are responsible for the overall management 
of  the  forum  and  making  long  term  strategic  decisions.  Such 
strategic decisions include protecting the forum from attacks by 
other similar carding forums, should they become involved in a 
“board  war”.  Administrators are  also  responsible for  managing 
the  forum  members  including  rewards  and  punishments  when 
appropriate. In particular, they safeguard the forum by removing 
the “rippers”, the members who have cheated money off others. 
                                                                  
1 Drop – an intermediary location at which carders could use 
as  delivery  address  for  physical  goods  bought  with 
fraudulent  cards.  They  are  also  used  to  refer  to 
intermediary bank accounts used in money laundering. 
Moderators: the moderators are responsible for the management 
of  the  sub-forums  within  a  forum  which  either  fall  into  their 
expertise  or  geographical  location.  They  specify  the  rules  for 
posts as well as removing inappropriate ones.  
Reviewers:  their duty is to test illicit merchandises and services 
from the members wanting to become a vendor. This is the key 
part of the trust mechanism in place as these few reviewers are 
endorsed  by  the  majority  as trustworthy  and the  trust  on  them 
propagates to the vendors they review, allowing quality assurance 
to take place and propagate as supply increases. 
 
Figure 2: - a typical hierarchical chain of command in 
Western online carding forums 
Reviewed vendors: they are those who have been referenced by 
the  reviewers  and  are  deemed  as  trustworthy.  As  reputation  is 
crucial to their success and the only way the system can recognize 
these reviewed vendors is through their chosen username, these 
usernames  become  attached  to  their  reputation.  Thus,  most 
members rarely change their usernames within a forum. 
Members: normal members who are not reviewed vendors may 
also  sell  goods  on  carding  forums  but  they  most  often  sell  at 
lower prices due to the lack of credibility. Those who buy from 
them bare the risk at their own discretion. The services offered by 
the members are generally similar to the ones listed by Thomas 
and Martin [9]. Many carders are members of various different 
forums.  
This  hierarchy  is  crucial  as  it  puts  in  place  a  monitoring 
mechanism  to  defeat  the  rippers,  thus  allowing  the  carders  to 
trade without needing to worry about being ripped.  
4.  CHINESE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
To comprehensively compare Western and Chinese carding, this 
study focused on finding the ways in which the Chinese carders 
accomplish similar services offered by the Western online forums. 
In  particular,  this  section  presents  how  the  Chinese  carders 
advertise  goods  and  services,  the  trust  mechanism  in  place  to 
avoid rippers, privacy to hold private negotiations and trading. 4.1  Advertising, trust and communication 
The  most  essential  element  of  carding  is the need to  advertise 
goods and services as well as a way to find these advertisements. 
In the Western carding forums, this is relatively trivial as forum 
posts are ordered chronologically and most forums offer a search 
engine for conducting keyword-based search for relevant posts. 
Furthermore,  negotiations  could  take  place  using  the  forum’s 
private messaging function or using ICQ
2. There are two primary 




4.1.1  Baidu Tieba 
As Zhuge et al. have noted, the Chinese cybercriminals do not use 
IRC but more prefer to use Baidu, China’s largest search engine 
[14].  However,  aside  from  searching,  Baidu  also  offer  various 
social networking services, most notably the Baidu Tieba. 
Baidu  Tieba  is  a  publicly  accessible  and  searchable  message 
board system where specific boards (called “bar”) can be freely 
created by a registered user under a specific title. Once the bar is 
created, it will be indexed by Baidu and the contents within these 
boards become easily searchable.  
Users  can  choose  whether  to  make  a  post  on  the  board 
anonymously.  If  the  user  is  registered,  his  username  will  be 
shown as the author. If the user is not registered, the first three 
range of his IP address is shown in the author’s field. This means 
the anonymity of the users is preserved.      
The lack of control of the Baidu Tieba, the permanent storage of 
posts, the preservation of anonymity and content search ability, 
makes Baidu Tieba the most convenient place for Chinese carders 
to advertise their goods and services as well as for those searching 
for  specific  services.  The  most  popular  boards  used  by  the 
Chinese carders are: “visa”, “master” and “cvv”. 
A typical sale advert is as shown in figure 3. The typical format of 
an advert on Baidu Tieba consists of a short message containing a 
brief  description  of  the  goods  and  services  for  sale  or  request 
(such as the country and types of credit cards) as well as leaving 
the QQ number for interested buyers to hold further negotiations 
in  private  conversations  via  QQ  (see  next  section  for  a  more 
detailed examination of QQ IM). This advertisement says that the 
seller has large quantities of credit card data from the US, UK, 
DE (Germany) and Japan.   
 
Figure 3: a typical carding related advert on Baidu Tieba 
One  of  the  most  fundamental  functions  offered  by  the  closed 
membership forum is a tight control over rippers with reviewed 
vendors  and  monitoring  by  the  administrators.  The  Chinese 
carders do not have such mechanism. Instead, rippers are posted 
and shamed on Baidu Tieba. 
                                                                  
2 http://www.icq.com 
3 http://tieba.baidu.com  
4 http://www.qq.com 
 
A typical report on rippers would consist of the QQ number of the 
ripper and some evidence as proof of ripping.  Given the ease of 
searching  for  contents  in  posts  on  Baidu  Tieba,  the  Chinese 
carders can avoid being ripped by performing a search for the QQ 
number of the carders they are interested in trading with, before 
entering any negotiations. 
4.1.2  QQ 
For private negotiations, the Chinese cybercriminals prefer to use 
Tencent’s QQ Instant Messenger (IM) as it is the most popular 
instant messenger in China. However, QQ is more than just an 
instant messenger.  QQ also offers a social networking service 
called QQ Group and its functionality is identical to that of an 
IRC channel. Unlike an IRC channel which is purely text based, 
multimedia content including text and images and webcam can be 
used on QQ groups. The QQ Groups found to be carding related 
are as follows: 
Table 1: carding related QQ groups 
QQ 
number 
Group name  No. of 
members 
60776008  国外 CVV 交易交流  138 
9849627  PP,MB,CB,Card 交流 1  64 
40702312  PP,MB,CB,Card 交流 2  84 
85707782  内外料交易群  86 
61981088  黑卡 CC  432 
55807561  夜猫俱乐部  229 
118731023  单身贵蔟  86 
118731529  单身贵蔟（4）  149 
31715092  财神到㊣EBAY/paypal 研究  199 
57758881  黑 CARD交流  55 
Thus, the QQ messenger can be seen as the combination of ICQ 
and IRC and combined with the Baidu Tieba, it is evident that 
there is no need for the Chinese carders to mimic their Western 
counterparts  and  use  closed  membership  forums,  which  are 
proven to be vulnerable to police undercover operations. 
4.2  Trading 
For Chinese carders, the most popular tool for trading is Taobao
5, 
China’s biggest online trading platform equivalent to eBay in the 
West.  Taobao  is  a  popular  place  for  Chinese  cybercriminals 
because there are no admin charges for sellers and buyers have 
the power to review the purchased goods before instructing the 
payment system, Alipay, to forward the paid funds to the seller to 
complete the transaction. 
5.  DISCUSSION 
There are two important implications from the results presented in 
this paper.  
Firstly, the results show that there are aspects of profit-seeking 
cybercrime  such  as  trading  and  negotiation,  which  can  be 
constrained by traditional boundaries of crime such as location, 
culture  and  language  barriers.  Future  research  could  focus  on 
                                                                  
5 Taobao – http://www.taobao.com  providing a quantitative analysis on such localized cybercrime, as 
well as an estimation of the volume and impact which can then be 
used to compare with the rest of the world.  
Secondly, it is evident that social networking is a critical process 
for the profit seeking cybercriminals. Thus, there is a strong need 
for them to establish ties with others in the absence of trust. This 
is an area in which the author is looking to explore for his future 
research  because  the  results  presented  in  this  paper  only 
demonstrate the existence of a difference in cybercriminal market 
structure,  not  necessarily  the  structure  of  cybercriminal 
organizations behind the “delivery” of cybercrime.  
Therefore, future research could include questions such as: “What 
are the structural patterns of interaction within the Western online 
carding forums and are they any different from those in China?”, 
“Are  there  any  hidden  key  players?”  [12],  “What  are  the 
constraints and opportunities provided by the different networks 
structures? For example: security/efficiency trade-off.”, “How do 
individual-level characteristics interact with relational (network-
level)  characteristics?”  [6]  and  “Is  there  a  cultural  or  ethnic 
difference?”. 
To attempt at answering the above questions, McIllwain argues 
one  should  first  realize  that  the  least  common  denominator  of 
organized crime is human relationships [4]. Social networking is 
inevitable for the provision of illicit goods and services as well as 
the protection, regulation and extortion of those engaged in the 
provision  or  consumption  of  these  goods  and  services.  This 
process of social networking occurs as part of a social system of 
organized  crime,  a  system  which  explains  the  remarkable 
consistency of the process of organizing crime across time and 
space. Therefore, to understand organized cybercrime, researchers 
and  analysts  should  focus  on  discovering  the  pattern  of 
relationships (ties) and to understand why and how they occur. 
This can be achieved using Social Network Analysis (SNA), a 
theoretical  and  methodological  paradigm  for  sophisticated 
examination  of  complex  social  structures  and  has  long  been 
suggested as a tool that could aid criminal intelligence proposed 
by Sparrow in 1991 [8]. The works by Xu and Chen provide some 
encouraging results in the use of SNA to study the dark web [13]. 
Social  psychology  will  also  play  a  vital  role  because  as 
highlighted by Robbins, any network analysis risks an incomplete 
analysis  if  the  social  psychology  of  the  target  network  is 
neglected [6]. That is, since the target network is a human social 
system, it is unreasonable to neglect the individual factors which 
influence  the  network  structure,  that  is,  the  individual  factors 
which are explanatory of network features. 
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